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JOHNSON V. M'INTOSH REVISITED: THROUGH THE
EYES OF MITCHEL V. UNITED STATES
David E. Wilkins*
Introduction
In the first four decades of the nineteenth century, the United States
Supreme Court handed down five seminal decisions written by Chief Justice
John Marshall, forming the political-philosophical-legal basis of tribal-state-
federal relations. It is unnecessary to elaborate on the principles derived from
these decisions - Fletcher v. Peck,' New Jersey v. Wilson,' Johnson v.
M'intosh3 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,4 and Worcester v. Georgid
because they have been analyzed or at least broached by virtually every
scholar wading into the turbid discipline of federal Indian law
This article will focus on (1) the question of the legal status of Indian titles
(aboriginal possessory rights) to land; and (2) what, if any, limitations are
there on the rights of tribes to convey their title to whomever they wish. This
set of questions requires us, first, to recapitulate the principles announced in
the M'Intosh decision which forcefully addressed the issue of Indian land title
and the apparently "diminished" right of tribes to transmit the same and
second, to then move to examine in great detail the little-discussed 1835
Supreme Court decision, Mitchel v. United States.! This case fundamentally
* Assistant Professor of Political Science and American Indian Studies, University of
Arizona. Ph.D., 1990, University of North CarolinatChapel Hill; M.A., 1982, University of
Arizona; B.A., 1976, Pembroke State University. I want to thank Professor Vine Deloria, Jr., who
originally brought Mitchel to my attention. In addition, he suggested the comparative approach
this article employs. Furthermore, Dr. Deloria gave a thorough and critical analysis of an earlier
draft of this article. Any mistakes, however, are shouldered by the author.
I. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
2. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812).
3. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
4. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
5. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
6. See, e.g., Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics & Morality.
21 STAN. L. REy. 500 (1969); Jill C. Norgren & Petra T. Shattuck, Limits of Legal Action: The
Cherokee Cases, 2 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & REs. J. 14 (1978); JOHN R. WUNDER, THE
CHEROKEE CASES, IN HISTORIC UNITED STATES CASES, 1690-1990: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 409-17
(John W. Johnson ed., 1992); 3-4 G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF THE SUPRFEM COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE: 1815-35, at 703-40 (Paul A.
Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1991). Although legal commentators obviously dominate the field
of federal Indian law, historians, a few hardy political scientists, and a smattering of
anthropologists have also braved analysis of these pivotal Supreme Court cases.
7. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835). Despite Mitchel's importance, the decision has previously
received only scant attention. See Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28
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contradicts the doctrines enunciated in M'Intosh. A critical review of Mitchel
will reveal that (1) the doctrine of discovery elaborated by Marshall in
M'lntosh and used to diminish tribal sovereignty is without credibility as a
legal principle; (2) tribes are the possessors of a sacrosanct title that is "as
sacred as the fee-simple";' (3) tribes may alienate their aboriginal territory to
whomever they wish, and the question of whether the non-aboriginal purchas-
er has the authorization of a sovereign is a matter that cannot be used to
reduce indigenous rights; (4) an argument based on alleged inferior tribal
cultural status, regardless of its differences with Western culture, will not
inhibit aboriginal sovereignty; and finally (5) tribes as collective entities and
the individual members thereof are entitled to international protections of their
recognized treaty rights which survived the federal government's assumption
of jurisdiction upon Spanish cession of Florida.
We should open this article, however, with a pertinent question: why has
Mitchel heretofore not received the scholastic, jurisprudential, or popular
attention it clearly deserves? Is it because the decision was written by Justice
Henry Baldwin (one of the least liked and most bizarre justices) and not the
(1947) [hereinafter Cohen, Original Indian Title] (arguing that Mitchel involved a situation where
the Indian sale to whites had been made with the consent of the sovereign, in contrast to Johnson
v. M'ntosh which, in Cohen's opinion, involved an illegal land transfer). For a parenthetical
reference to Mitchel, see the oft-cited classic FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 122-23 (Univ. of N.M. Press photo. reprint 1971) (1942). In a section focusing on
aboriginal title, Cohen extracted a quote from Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211,244 (1872),
wherein Justice Nathan Clifford remarked that the Cherokees held a title to their lands which
"was absolute, subject only to the preemption right of purchase acquired by the United States as
the successors of Great Britain ...." COHEN, supra, at 293. For a more current reference relating
to Cohen, see FELIX S. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Rennard Strickland et
al. eds., 1982), which also briefly mentions Mitchel, id. at 442, 472, 485, 491,508, 510, 512, 605,
but only insofar as the decision discussed actual tribal "use and occupancy over an extended
period of time." Id. at 442. Indian interests in real property were discussed as being "as sacred
as the fee-simple title of the whites." Id. at 472. In a telling passage, the 1982 revisers vaguely
note in describing Mitchel that the case "involved some difficult questions of Spanish law." Id.
at 485.
For a hint at the importance of Mitchel, see Milner Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes,
1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1 (1987). "Mitchel ... concerned title to land in Florida. Grants
had been made by Indians under the authority of Spain, before cession... Spain had allocated
to Indians a property right, and the United States was bound by the right under treaty .... " Id.
at 33 n.152.
Finally, for a different view of the opinion, see Petra T. Shattuck & Jill Norgren, PARTIAL
JUSTICE: FEDERAL INDIAN LAW IN A LIBERAL CONSITUTIONAL SYSTEM (1991). Their
commondable work devotes but a single paragraph to the decision. While noting that Mitchel
"held general faith with Worcester," they also assert that it was "an early example of the use of
[M'Intosh] as authority." Id. at 51. And while correctly acknowledging that Mitchel established
the principle that "Indian title included the power to transfer as well as to occupy," they
incorrectly interpret the ruling by concluding that the Supreme Court "maintained its commitment
to discovery theory and the dual, or split, nature of Indian land title." Id.
8. Mitchel, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 746.
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vaunted Chief Justice John Marshall? Or, from a contemporary standpoint, is
it because Mitchel, by articulating a much more historically and legally
accurate portrayal of indigenous land tenure, challenges and actually disputes
both conservative and liberal views of tribal-Western political relations?
Conservatives may discount or ignore the decision because it affirms the
sanctity of Indian or aboriginal title even though this title is not based on
Lockean views of private property. Liberals may not have given the decision
much attention because it turns the "doctrine of discovery" (read: the
European discoverer secures absolute title to Indian lands, subject only to the
Indians' right of occupancy, which can be appropriated at any time by
purchase or conquest) on its head. This doctrine, when defined in such a
brazen fashion, is the core principle which fuels a liberal-radical view of
tribal-Western relations which invariably depict tribes as the helpless victims
of a European or European-derived colonial juggernaut intent on destroying
all vestiges of indigenous rights.
However, a careful analysis of Mitchel, when linked to Marshall's
Worcester decision, shows that the key concepts of "discovery" and
"conquest" were actually terms designed more to limit competition between
European nations; they were not, strictly speaking, created to diminish
indigenous rights. Of course, if is possible that Mitchel has been ignored or
overlooked for the simple reason that academics and jurists have simply been
too preoccupied with Marshall's "major" Indian law decisions (especially
M'Intosh, Cherokee Nation, and Worcester), or that since Felix Cohen said
very little about the case in his treatise on federal Indian law, the bible of
most Indian law experts, it was not deemed important enough to warrant
serious scrutiny. It will be shown, however, that the Mitchel case should
indeed be merged with the first-tier Indian law cases. In fact, a convincing
argument can and will be made that this ruling should be placed among those
considered the most important cases in federal Indian law.
Johnson v. M'Intosh: A Recapitulation
According to most commentators, M'Jntosh is the foundational case which
first addressed aboriginal possessory rights. The principal question to be
resolved by the Court was whether the Indian title which had been ceded by
the Illinois and Piankeshaw tribes to the plaintiffs (Johnson, et al.,) under two
separate land transactions in 1773 and 1775 could be "recognized in the courts
of the United States"9 or whether the defendant's (M'Intosh's) title which had
been purchased from the United States in 1818 - land that was part of
Johnson's original purchase from the Indians - was valid. As stated more
specifically by Chief Justice Marshall, "The inquiry, therefore, is, in a great
9. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572 (1823).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1994
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
measure, confined to the power of Indians to give, and of private individuals
to receive, a title which can be sustained in the courts of this country."'"
The Illinois and Piankeshaw tribes had sold the same land to both the
plaintiff and the defendant, although Johnson's deeds predated M'Intosh's by
over forty-five years. The plaintiffs, however, because of the eruption of the
American Revolution, had never been able to take possession of the land,
although they began petitioning Congress as early as 1781 for relief." Yet
there was no question that the Illinois and Piankeshaw tribes held original
possession of the land. There was, in addition, no doubt that the tribes' sale
of the land to a group of land speculators preceded Virginia and United States
efforts to convey the same land to McIntosh. It is true that Johnson and
Graham were indeed private individuals "without any public authority or
previous license from the Government," although these land transactions had
taken place at British military posts in full view of military and civil officers,
and the completed deeds were then attested to by these same officers.'"
Furthermore, the Indian chiefs who ceded the land to the plaintiffs'
predecessors were, in fact, the duly authorized leaders of their nations.
Nevertheless, Marshall and his brethren arrived at the startling conclusion that
Indian tribes did not have and therefore could not convey their allegqdly
"incomplete" title to whomever they wished.
Instead of addressing the single question raised by the facts: whether
private individuals could purchase Indian land, or whether only the national
government had that authority, Marshall raised and then answered an entirely
different and far more profound question, especially since Indian tribes were
not parties in the suit: Do tribes have a title that can be conveyed to
whomever they choose? By asking this self-generated question and in
answering it negatively, Marshall, in the process of this unanimous opinion,
both created and recreated a set of legal rationalizations to justify the
reduction of Indian rights without allowing any room for the Indian voice.
This is evidently his purpose in the second paragraph of his opinion where
he states:
As the right of society, to prescribe those rules by which property
may be acquired and preserved is not, and cannot be drawn into
question; as the title to lands, especially, is and must be admitted, to
depend entirely on the law of the nation in which they lie; it will be
1G. Id.
11. See Memorial No. 177 to the House of Representatives, I Ith Cong., 3d Sess.,
Concerning the Illinois and Wabash Land'Companies (Dec. 21, 1810), in 2 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE, OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
at 108, 108 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., Gales & Seaton 1834) [hereinafter
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS].
12. Id., in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note II, at 112.
13. Id.
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necessary, in pursuing this inquiry, to examine, not singly those
principles of abstract justice.. . which are admitted to regulate, in a
great degree, the rights of civilized nations... but those principles also
which our own government has adopted in the particular case, and given
us as the rule for our decision."
Here Marshall was asserting that if the rule of law or "abstract justice"'" was in
conflict with the national government's right to generate rules favorable to its own
needs then it was the court's duty to adapt principles or amend existing principles
which will sanction those new standards. In other words, the rule of law, which
should have led to a decision in favor of the plaintiffs because of their preexisting
property rights, was circumvented in this case and the politically expedient
compromise agreed to by the founders of the American Republic which "provided
for the cession of frontier claims by the 'landed' states to a federal sovereign
claiming exclusive rights to extinguish Indian occupancy claims by purchase or
conquest ... settled the legal status and rights of the American Indian in United
States law."" The bulk of Marshall's opinion, as most observers note, was spent
articulating or rearticulating the "doctrine of discovery."'7 This doctrine has been
vilified by a number of writers,"8 though a small minority of scholars have argued
that "Marshall's version of the doctrine of discovery has small consequence for the
tribes."'" Notwithstanding the minority views' substantial arguments, the reality for
tribes over the years has been that the major principles emanating from M'Intosh -
the discovery doctrine, the inferior status of Indian property rights, the notion of
14. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572.
15. Id.
16. ROBERT WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT 231
(1990).
17. VINE DELORIA & CLIFFORD LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 4 (1983)
(contending that Marshall's characterization of the "doctrine of discovery" was really a corrupted
version of the discovery principle first discussed by Francisco de Vitoria in 1532).
18. See, e.g., id.; WILLIAMS, supra note 16; FRANKE WILMER, THE INDIGENOUS VOICE IN
WORLD POLITICS 1 (1993).
19. Ball, supra note 7, at 25. "Mhe Indian property interest is described as a 'title of
occupancy.' It is recognized and protected. And it can be conveyed to non-Indians." Id. Ball
continues:
It has all the indicia of fee simple except this: unless a non-Indian purchaser is
licensed by the discovering sovereign or that sovereigns successor, the non-Indian
purchaser takes only the Indian's interest. That is, the unlicensed purchaser takes
everything except what Marshall describes variously as "absolute title," "absolute
ultimate title," or "complete ultimate title." "Absolute title" is an abstract
tautology. . . .The plaintiffs' (Johnson, et al.) claim to the land was defeated
principally because the Indians themselves had extinguished plaintiffs' interest.
Id.; see also Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra note 7, at 47 (stating that "the dismissal of the
plaintiffs' complaint in this case was not based upon any defect in the Indians' title, but solely
upon the invalidity of the Indian deed through which the white plaintiffs claimed title"); Nell
Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGS L.J.
1222 (1980).
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conquest, the alleged inferior cultural standing of tribes, the impaired ability of
tribes to sell their incomplete title, and the diminished political status of tribes -
have had lasting implications for political and legal relations among tribes, states,
and the federal government."
Marshall's retrospective vision of "discovery" - the definitive principle in the
case -- created a "landlord-tenant relationship between the federal government and
the Indian tribes. The federal government, as the ultimate landlord, not only
possessed the power to terminate the 'tenancy' of its occupants but also could
materially affect the lives of Indians through its control and regulation of land
use."2 Several quotations from the opinion vividly evidence this unilateral
transmutation of Indian property and political rights, based solely on self-generated
notions by the Supreme Court.
On the "Discovery" principle, Marshall stated:
On the discovery of this immense continent, the great nations
of Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves so much of it
as they could respectively acquire.... But, as they were all in
pursuit of nearly the same object, it was necessary, in order to
avoid conflicting settlements ... to establish a principle which all
should acknowledge as the law by which the right of acquisition,
which they all asserted, should be regulated as between them-
selves. This principle was, that discovery gave title to the
government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was
made, against all other European governments, which title might
be consummated by possession.
The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the
nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil
from the natives, and establishing settlements upon it. It was a
right with which no Europeans could interfere....
Thus has our whole country been granted by the crown while
in the occupation of the Indians. These grants purport to convey
the soil as well as the right of dominion to the grantees....
Thus, all the nations of Europe, who have acquired territory on
this continent, have asserted in themselves, and have recognized
in others, the exclusive right of the discoverer to appropriate the
21). Howard R. Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the
United States, 27 BUFF. L. REv. 643 (1978). See generally JOHN R. WUNDER, "RETAINED BY THE
PEOPI.E": A HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1994); FRANKE WILMER,
THE INDIGENOUS VOICE IN WORLD POLITICS (1993); JAMES E. FALKOWSKI, INDIAN LAW/RACE
LAW: A FIvE-HUNDRED YEAR HISTORY (1992); PETRA T. SHATTUCK & JILL NORGREN, PARTIAL
JUsTICE: FEDERAL INDIAN LAW IN A LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM (1991).
21. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 17, at 26-27.
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lands occupied by the Indians. Have the American states rejected
or adopted this principle?
The United States, then, have unequivocally acceded to that
great and broad rule by which its civilized inhabitants now hold
this country. They hold, and assert in themselves, the title by
which it was acquired. They maintain, as all others have main-
tained, that discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the
Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest; and
gave also a right to such a degree of sovereignty, as the circum-
stances of the people would allow them to exercise.
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discov-
ery of an inhabited country into conquest may appear, if the
principle has been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards
sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if the
property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it
becomes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned.'
Regarding the tribes' impaired rights to both soil and sovereignty, Marshall
stated:
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original
inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were
necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were
admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as
well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it accord-
ing to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereign-
ty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their
power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever
they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle
that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the
natives, as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be
in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of
this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in
possession of the natives. These grants have been understood by
all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian
right of occupancy.
... The existence of this power [to grant lands] must negative
the existence of any right which may conflict with, and control it.
22. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572-73, 579, 584, 587, 591 (1823).
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An absolute title to lands cannot exist, at the same time, in
different persons, or in different governments. An absolute, must
be an exclusive title, or at least a title which excludes all others
not compatible with it. All our institutions recognize the absolute
title of the crown, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy;
and recognized the absolute title of the crown to extinguish that
right. This is incompatible with an absolute and complete title in
the Indians.
... So, too, with respect to the concomitant principle, that the
Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to be
protected, indeed, while in peace, in the possession of their lands,
but to be deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title to
others. However this restriction may be opposed to natural rights,
and to the usages of civilized nations, yet, if it be indispensable
to that system under which the country has been settled, and be
adapted to the actual condition of the two people, it may, perhaps,
be supported by reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by courts
of justice.
It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to
nothing. Their right of possession has never been questioned. The
claim of government extends to the complete ultimate title,
charged with this right of possession, and to the exclusive power
of acquiring that right."
The thrust of the Court's message in M'Intosh was that indigenous peoples
did not have the natural right exercised by "civilized" nations to sell their
property to whomever they wished. But why? Marshall had acknowledged
that they possessed certain rights and a form of title that could be disposed
of under certain situations. To legitimate the denial of full tribal territorial
sovereignty and complete political sovereignty, Marshall pulled together a
conflicting and confusing potpourri of arguments. First, he couched his
argument against recognition of full tribal property rights on the basis of their
allegedly inferior, non-Christian cultural status, though he tried to downplay
this cultural ethnocentrism by saying that "we will not enter into the
controversy, whether agriculturalists, merchants, and manufacturers, have a
right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters from the territory they possess,
or to contract their limits."'" This statement was more than offset, however,
by several other passages where the Chief Justice referred to tribes as "fierce
savages, whose occupation was war,"' as "warlike tribes";' or as people
23. Id. at 574, 588, 591-92, 603.
24. Id. at 588.
25. Id. at 590.
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"whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest."'  According to
Marshall, "To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the
country a wilderness.'
Second, Marshall made several equivocal statements about the concept of
"conquest" and how that affected the relationship between tribes and European
or Anglo-American nations. After a long discussion about the limitations
placed upon conquered peoples, Marshall rechanneled and redirected his
thoughts and stated that the "law which regulates, and ought to regulate in
general, the relations between the conqueror and conquered, was incapable of
application to a people [tribes] under such circumstances."' The result was
that the Court created a "new and different rule, better adapted to the actual
state of things."' That rule, as noted earlier, was Marshall's deployment of
the doctrine of discovery and the doctrine of conquest, no matter how
"extravagant" and pretentious it was, to legitimize the United States power
over tribes.'
Finally, Marshall argued that Johnson and Graham as successors to the
original purchasers of Indian title in the two pre-revolutionary land transac-
tions, had in buying land "within their territory, incorporate[d] [them]selv[es]
with them, so far as respects the property purchased;" and therefore "holds
their title under their [tribal] protection, and [is] subject to their laws."32 The
United States, by contrast, in concluding post-revolutionary treaties with the
tribes for the same territory, had secured recognizable title to the lands in
dispute in part because "[tihese [tribes] had been at war with the United
States, and had an unquestionable right to annul any grant they had made to
American citizens. Their cession of the country, without a reservation of this
land, affords a fair presumption that they considered it as of no validity."33
In short, the Chief Justice was saying that the plaintiffs' claims were defeated
because the tribes themselves had extinguished their interest by selling the
land again, this time to the United States.
In conclusion, Marshall had cleverly reached a political/legal compromise
that avoided two contrasting visions of Indian title: (1) that the doctrine of
discovery completely vanquished Indian title in toto, or (2) that tribes held a
title equal to the fee-simple title that was wholly unaffected by the claims of
the European and U.S. "discoverers."' The former would have left the tribes
26. Id. at 586.
27. Id. at 590.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 591.
30. Id.
31. Berman, supra note 20, at 655. But see Ball, supra note 7, at 28 n.132 (providing a
splendid analysis of Marshall's equivocation on the doctrine of conquest).
32. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 593 (1823).
33. Id. at 594.
34. Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra note 7, at 48.
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with no enforceable interests whatsoever; the later would have nullified state
and federal grants derived from Indians. The end result, of course, was the
enshrinement and institutionalization of a theory of tribal "subservience to the
federal government.""5 Put more pithily, M'Intosh's "acceptance of the
Doctrine of Discovery into United States law preserved the legacy of 1,000
years of European racism and colonialism directed against non-Western
peoples. White society's exercise of power over Indian tribes received the
sanction of the Rule of Law in Johnson v. M'Intosh."'
The Cherokee Cases: The Bridge to Mitchel
The Marshall court had dispatched Johnson and Graham's appeal for an
ejectment of M'Intosh without any "intrinsic difficulty." '37 Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia8 and Worcester v. Georgia," however, would not be so easily
resolved. As noted above, these cases have been analyzed many times and
need not be elaborated here. It is generally accepted that the Cherokee cases,
along with M'Intosh, constructed the basic underpinnings of tribal property
rights, as well as tribal status in relation to the states and the federal
government. As Deloria and Lytle point out:
The Cherokee Nation Cases should be considered as one fundamental
statement having two basic thrusts on the status of Indian tribes. In the
first case [Cherokee Nation] Marshall defined the relationship of Indian
tribes to the federal government and in the second case [Worcester] he
described the relationship of the tribes to the several states.4
Mitchel v. United States: The Prelude
In the most detailed examination4' of Mitchel to date, Cohen asserted that
[w]hereas [Johnson v. M'Intosh] had held that an unauthorized
Indian sale could not give a title superior to that later obtained by
treaty, the case of Mitchel v. United States dealt with the obverse
situation where the Indian sale relied upon had been made with
the consent of the sovereign. In such case, the Court held, the
35. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 17, at 26.
36. WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 317.
37. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 604.
38. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
39. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
40. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 17, at 33.
41. Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra note 7, at 50-51. Cohen's article devotes about one
page to Mitchel.
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purchases from the Indians secured a title superior to any title
which the United States could assert.4
Cohen noted the Court had observed that the United States could not secure
from the Spanish King property that did not belong to the monarch, and that
Indian property or grantees of that property could not become vested to the
royal family or the federal government without formal judicial action43
Cohen concluded his brief analysis of the case by stating that
what had been conceded, by way of dictum, in [Johnson v.
M'Intosh], namely that Indian title included power to transfer as
well as to occupy, is the core of the decision in the Mitchel case.
Finally, Mitchel clarifies the scope of the rule of respect for
Indian possessions by expressly rejecting the view that such
possession extended only to improved lands."
While Cohen is rightly considered the founding father of federal Indian
law, and while his research and analysis are excellent, it does not necessarily
follow that his interpretation of case law is infallible. An analysis of Mitchel
will show, conversely, that M'Intosh and Mitchel actually have much more in
common than is generally understood and that the fact situations have a
certain similarity, notwithstanding Cohen's perspective of what the Court held.
In fact, Cohen's statement that M'Intosh was based on an unauthorized Indian
sale - because the land in question was purchased by "a private individual
claiming title to land by reason of a private purchase from an Indian tribe not
consented to by the sovereign"45 - is only partially correct. This will be
discussed further itfta. And if this important historical fact is not as Cohen
presented it, then heightened scrutiny must be applied to Cohen's interpreta-
tion of the Mitchel case.
Before proceeding to our examination of Mitchel, however, it is pertinent
to point out three interesting items. First, John Marshall, who had authored
all of the previous Indian law cases, for some reason chose to not write this
decision, although he did author the brief opening section in which the Court
denied the motion of the U.S. attorney for a postponement of the Court's
verdict. Marshall retired from the bench in July 1835, the same term in which
Mitchel was decided.
Second, Mitchel was a unanimous ruling that postdates M'Intosh by over
a decade, possibly indicating firm ideological consensus on the merits of the
case. Third, and of most importance, Justice Henry Baldwin was the author
of the opinion. Baldwin, it must be recalled, provided a separate opinion in
42. Id. at 50.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra note 7, at 47.
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the Cherokee Nation case in which he agreed with the majority to dismiss the
Cherokee Nation's case "but not for the reasons assigned."' Baldwin, in fact,
did not believe that the Cherokee Nation, or by extension any other tribe, was
a sovereign independent nation entitled to sue in the federal courts. Baldwin's
views expressed in Cherokee Nation on tribal sovereignty, Indian treaties, and
the tribal-federal and state-tribal relationship warrant some discussion.
'Baldwin asserted that the federal government, in enacting the Northwest
Ordinance in 1787,"7 paid "no regard to Indian jurisdiction, sovereignty, or
their political rights, except providing for their protection . . . ."" In his
narrow analysis of Indian treaties, the associate justice said the treaties were
not negotiated between ministers on both sides representing their
nations; the stipulations are wholly inconsistent with sovereignty;
the Indians acknowledge their dependent character; hold the lands
they occupy as an allotment of hunting-grounds; [and] give to
Congress the exclusive right of regulating their trade and manag-
ing all their affairs as they may think proper.49
In sum, "[m]ere phraseology cannot make Indians nations, or Indian tribes
foreign states."'
In voicing his undivided support of Georgia sovereignty over Cherokee
territory, Baldwin categorically asserted that "Indian sovereignty cannot be
roused from its long slumber, and awakened to action by our fiat." t Finally,
while acknowledging that Indians had rights of occupancy to their lands which
were "as sacred as the fee simple," still Baldwin quoted liberally from
M'Intosh and said these were "only rights of occupancy, incapable of
alienation, or being held by any other than common right without permission
from the government."'"
Baldwin's tenure on the Court, from 1830 until his death in 1844, was
considered particularly "distracting." 3 He was considered "conceited, willful,
and wrongheaded."' Fellow Justice Joseph Story in 1833 bluntly stated that
Baldwin's
opinions ... are so utterly wrong in principle and authority, that
I am sure he cannot be sane. And indeed, the only charitable
46. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 31 (1831).
47. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8. 1 St. 50.
48. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 35.
49. Id. at 38.
50. lid at 44.
51. Id. at 47.
52. Id. at 48.
53. WHITE, supra note 6, at 298.
54. Id. (quoting Letter from Justice Joseph Story to Justice Joseph Hopkinson (May 9,
1833)).
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view which I can take of any of his conduct is that he is partially
deranged at all times. His distaste for the Supreme Court and
especially for [Chief Justice Marshall] is so familiarly known to
us that it excites no surprise.'
Baldwin, in fact, missed the entire 1833 term "because of mental illness."'
Notwithstanding his mental disorder, an evaluation of the Mitchel ruling
will show that it is one of the most lucid, historically accurate, and highly
principled decisions ever handed down by the Supreme Court; particularly
insofar as it contains one of the most articulate and straightforward accounts
of the interplay of European nations in their affairs with tribes and how the
law of nations were clearly relevant to the protection and enhancement of
undiminished aboriginal sovereign rights. Moreover, this decision, when read
in conjunction with Worcester, goes far towards undermining, although not
explicitly disavowing, the disastrous doctrines unleashed in M'Intosh.
A short historical summary of indigenous-Spanish-U.S. relations is
necessary to provide the necessary historical backdrop before discussing
Mitchel.
Indigenous, Spanish, Anglo-American Affairs'
After the French and Indian War was concluded by the Treaty of Paris in
1763, Spain, which had sent explorers to circumnavigate and invade Florida
as early as 1513, ceded East and West Florida to Great Britain. However,
after the American Revolution, the embryonic American Republic was in a
desperate struggle to gain control over much of the territory it had fought to
secure from the tribes, Great Britain, and Spain. Spain had also fought the
fledgling American colonies in the war against Great Britain. And in the
succeeding peace negotiations Spain had regained dominion, from a European
perspective, of Florida and the Gulf Coast region east of New Orleans; in
addition, the nation remained the preeminent European power in the
Southwest region of the North American continent.
The Jay Treaty of 1794 between the United States and Great Britain, in
which the British agreed to evacuate its military posts in the West, was a
prelude to the Pinckney Treaty that was worked out the following year
between Spain and the federal government. The Spanish, fearing British
attack and concerned over their inability to organize wide-scale Indian
resistance against the Americans, had decided that a diplomatic settlement
might prevent a total collapse of their ever-weakening colonial position in
North America. In the Pinckney Treaty, Spain granted the United States free
55. Id.
56. Id. at 299.
57. 1 JOHN A. GARRATY, THE AMERICAN NATON: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1st
ed. 1966). This section draws from Garraty's work.
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navigation of the Mississippi River and accepted the American version of the
disputed Florida boundary.
The Spanish role in Florida grew even more precarious after the War of
1812. The United States military seized the rest of West Florida in 1813 and
Anglo frontiersmen eyed East Florida covetously. Moreover, Creek and
Seminole warriors often raided American territory and would then slip back
into Florida for refuge. In addition, escaping African slaves would often flee
into Florida seeking sanctuary.
In 1818 President James Monroe ordered General Andrew Jackson to quell
the Seminole raids of American settlements.58 Jackson marched into Florida
and captured two Spanish forts. In the process he captured and hanged two
British subjects who he alleged had been inciting the Seminoles against the
United States. 9 Although Jackson later withdrew from Florida, it was
evident that the Spanish presence in that territory would not last.
Hence, in 1819 the so-called Adams-Onis "Transcontinental Treaty" was
signed between Spain and the United States. By this treaty Spain ceded not
only its tenuous jurisdiction over Florida but, more importantly, the United
States forced the Spanish monarch to relinquish "a boundary to the Louisiana
Territory that followed the Sabine, Red, and Arkansas rivers to the Continen-
tal Divide and the 42nd parallel to the Pacific, thus abandoning Spain's claim
to a huge area beyond the Rockies that had no connection at all with the
Louisiana Purchase."' We now turn to the facts of the Mitchel case.
Mitchel. The Facts
Panton, Leslie, & Co., an English mercantile house, had established itself
in St. Augustine, East Florida, sometime prior to Spain's reassertion of
territorial jurisdiction vis-A-vis Great Britain in 1783. The house had
"extensive connections and great credit in England, and its operations were
very great."" When Spain secured jurisdiction of Florida by virtue of the
1783 Treaty, the Spanish monarch by'royal edict authorized the mercantile
house by license to "carry on and continue their commercial operations in
those provinces and Louisiana. ' The house, although operating in a
satisfactory manner according to Spanish commercial law, nevertheless
sustained a number of material losses (estimated at over $60,000) at the hands
of Seminole raiding parties, led by Bowles, in 1792 and 1800.
The company's representatives immediately began petitioning the Spanish
crown seeking compensation for those losses. Panton, Leslie, & Co. pressed
the "great importance and services of the house as a political instrument of the
58. Id. at 205.
59. Id.
60. d at 206.
61. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 726 (1835).
62. Id.
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government; that they had a right to indemnity from the king; that the
situation of the house was such, that they must sink under their losses if it
was not afforded; and that it must be sustained and preserved as indispensable
to retain any control over the Indians, and secure the possession of the
provinces entrusted to their care. '
The company's protestations soon paid off. First, the Spanish Governor of
Louisiana issued a grant of "twenty leagues square of royal lands west of the
Mississippi, or a loan of four hundred thousand dollars without security.""
Second, the company received permission from the Louisiana governor to
purchase from the Seminoles, who had agreed to provide compensation in the
form of lands, enough territory to satisfy Panton, Leslie & Co.'s claims. In
a series of negotiations with the Seminoles over the next seven years, the
mercantile house in four separate purchases secured the Indian title to over
1,250,000 acres of tribal land. As Baldwin noted, insofar as
the merits of the case depend on the genuineness of the deeds and
documents, the facts of the grants and confirmations by the
Indians and governor, the marking the lines and possession of the
land, the good faith of the whole transaction, the absence of fraud,
the authority of the Indian chiefs, as representatives of their
respective tribes, we entirely concur with the court below.'
Colin Mitchel and others, plaintiffs in the case, by various deeds from the
Seminoles, the Creek Confederacy, and Panton, Leslie, & Company, John
Forbes & Company, and John Forbes, had purchased all the land in
controversy. The United States, on the other hand, claimed the land by virtue
of the 1819 treaty of cession by Spain in which the federal government
acquired the Floridas for five million dollars "paid in extinguishment of
certain claims of the citizens of the United States on the government of
Spain." '7 The U.S. did, however, acknowledge the "equity" of Mitchel et
al.'
Mitchel: The Question and Legal Route of the Case
The question, as stated by Baldwin, was "whether at the time the cession
by the treaty took effect in favour of the United States, there was a right of
property in Colin Mitchel to the lands included in his grants, or whether they
had been previously granted by the lawful authorities of the king."' Mitchel
63. Id.
64. Id. at 727.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 730-31.
67. Id. at 725.
68. Id. at 737.
69. Id. at 738.
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had filed his petition in October 1828 in the superior court of middle Florida,
using a congressional law enacted earlier that year which allowed for the
settlement of private land claims in Florida. The superior court dismissed
Mitchel's claim in November 1830. He immediately appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, but the case was postponed at the behest of the federal
government's attorneys "to enable the government... to procure papers from
Madrid and from Havana, which were considered important and necessary in
the cause."7 Although these delays were bitterly contested by Mitchel's
attorneys, the case was stalled until 1835 when Chief Justice Marshall refused
to issue any more postponements noting that "[t]he Court ... must see with
its own eyes, and exercise its own judgement, guided by its own reason.""
Legal Arguments Raised by Mitchel's Attorneys
Mitchel's lawyers stressed the following major points. First, that the Indian
sales and the confirmations of these deeds by the governor of Florida
"vest[ed] in the grantees a full and complete title to the land in controver-
sy."' Second, that Spain's King was legally bound to indemnify the
mercantile company for the losses it had sustained as a result of Indian
depredations. Third, that the land transactions had been formally assented to
and ratified by all the appropriate Spanish officials, such action amounting to
an "acquiescence on the part of the King of Spain and his legitimate
authorities; which ... vest[ed] a valid title in the grantees."' Finally, that
Mitchel and the other grantees had legal possession of the disputed territory
"since the date of the respective.grants" which entailed title by prescription
under Spanish law.7'
Legal Arguments Relied on by the U.S. Attorneys
Attorney General Benjamin F. Butler, representing the federal government,
admitted that the Forbes & Co. mercantile house had provided important
services to Spain and was entitled to compensation for the losses it had
sustained from Indian raids. However, he elaborately argued that notwith-
standing this, the Supreme Court had to affirm the lower court's decision
unless it could be proved that Mitchel et al. "had a legal right to the lands in
question" either by grant or concession before the U.S. acquired it in 1818,
or by "virtue of some other valid title."" This, they argued, was an impossi-
bility.
70. Id. at 717.
71. Id. at 723.
72. Id. at 718.
73. Id.
74. Id.
'75. Id. at 719.
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The major points utilized by the United States were (1) that the King of
Spain was not, in "point of fact," liable to indemnify Forbes & Co. under "the
law of nations... []or any existing treaty";76 and (2) that the King had made
no "substantive grant" of the land in question to the appellants but was based
"on cessions made by Indian tribes, and on alleged ratifications and confirma-
tions thereof, and acquiescence therein, by the Spanish authorities."' The
Attorney General argued, according to Mitchel, that "[i]n this respect, the
present case differs from all the cases hitherto submitted to this Court.""8
Third, the U.S. argued that since the Indian tribes had no legal title to cede,
then Panton, Leslie & Co. could have secured no valid or recognizable legal
right to the land in question. Fourth, it was argued that under Spanish law,
absolute title rested with Spain. "The Indians, by those laws, were regarded
as having no title whatever," merely a right of occupancy to those tracts they
"actually inhabited."'" Finally, the U.S. argued, the Indian right of occupan-
cy, "if any ever existed," had been extinguished by a 1765 treaty between
Great Britain and the Indians, and by the Treaty of 1783 Spain succeeded to
all the rights of soil and sovereignty previously possessed by Great Britain."
The Indian deeds had been invalidated by this series of events, according to
the Attorney General.!'
Mitchel: The Decision
Concisely stated, the Court held that since the Seminoles' sale of land to
Mitchel et al. and their predecessors (Panton, Leslie & Co.) had been made
with the consent of a European sovereign (Spain), the purchasers of the Indian
land thereby gained a superior title to any which the United States could
assert. Baldwin said that "this court is unanimously of opinion that the title
of the petitioner[s] . . . is valid by all the rules prescribed by the acts of
Congress . . . by the law of nations . . . [and by] the treaty between the
United States and Spain .... ." This is a stunning ruling for several reasons
and implicitly contradicts the very basis of the M'Intosh holding. First, and
in direct contrast to Baldwin's anti-sovereignty views expressed in Cherokee
Nation and in direct contrast to the M'Intosh ruling, the Supreme Court
recognized not only the sovereignty of the Seminole Nation, but also
explicitly acknowledged that the Indians had a title that was indeed transfer-
76. Id.
77. Id. at 720.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 720-21.
80. 1d at 720.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 761.
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able. As Baldwin noted, "The Indian right to the lands as property was not
merely of possession, that of alienation was concomitant .... "
Additionally, Baldwin's opinion has expressive language on the sovereign
status of tribes. He speaks glowingly of the Indian title (both occupied and
hunting territory) as being equal to or as "sacred as" whites' fee-simple. His
opinion is an implicit repudiation of the doctrine of discovery (it is not
mentioned in the case) as in any way diminishing the political status of
property rights of tribes. He has an emphatic description of the applicability
of international legal principles for the protection of tribal nations (and
individuals) and their mutually agreed-upon agreements with European
sovereigns. He, in addition, has express statements that the doctrine of
conquest in no way affected tribal property rights and was completely
irrelevant to the basic contractual relationship between tribes and European
nations and the United States. Finally, he has a meticulous analysis of how
the United States was legally and morally bound to uphold the treaties and
agreements its predecessor, Spain, had entered into with tribes. The
combination of these explicit and implicit statements serves as convincing
proof that flatly challenges the often equivocal M'Intosh doctrines.
Before proceeding with an explanation of why there are such clear
disparities in the two cases, several quotations from Baldwin's opinion are
necessary.
On Indian title, Baldwin stated that one rule seemed to prevail in the
former English colonies in America:
that friendly Indians were protected in the possession of the lands
they occupied, and were considered as owning them by a
perpetual right of possession in the tribe or nation inhabiting them
as their common property from generation to generation, not as
the right of the individuals located on particular spots.
Subject to this right of possession, the ultimate fee was in the
crown and its grantees, which could be granted by the crown or
colonial legislatures while the lands remained in possession of the
Indians, though possession could not be taken without their
consent.
.. [A]nd by this union of the perpetual right of occupancy
with the ultimate fee, which passed from the crown by the
license, the title of the purchaser became complete.
Indian possession or occupation was considered with reference
to their habits and modes of life; their hunting-grounds were as
much in their actual possession as the cleared fields of the
whites ....
83. Id. at 758.
[Vol, 19
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol19/iss1/6
No. 1] M'INTOSH REVISITED THROUGH MITCHEL 177
... [I]t is enough to consider it as a settled principle, that their
right of occupancy is considered as sacred as the fee simple of the
whites.'
On the Indians' right to sell their lands, Baldwin stated:
[Indians possessed the land] until they abandoned [it], made
a cession to the government, or an authorized sale to indivi-
duals ....
It was a universal rule that purchases made at Indian treaties,
in the presence and with the approbation of the officer under
whose direction they were held by the authority of the crown,
gave a valid title to the lands ....
[T]he King [of Spain] ... most solemnly acknowledged that
the Indians had rights of property which they could cede or
reserve ....
It may, then, be considered as a principle established by the
king that the Indians were competent judges of the consideration
on which they granted their lands ....
... [T]here can be no reason perceived why deeds or grants,
operating to confirm in full property to the purchasers from the
Indians, lands thus guarantied to them, should not be held in a
court of equity as valid as original grants of the royal domain.
The Indian right to the lands as property was not merely of
possession, that of alienation was concomitant; both were
equally secured, protected, and guarantied by Great Britain and
Spain . . .
Regarding the doctrine of conquest, Baldwin stated:
By thus holding treaties with these Indians, accepting of
cessions from them with reservations, and establishing boundaries
with them, the king waived all rights accruing by conquest or
cession ....
[The United States] could assume no right of conquest
which may at any time have vested in Great Britain or Spain, for
they had been solemnly renounced, and new relations established
between them by solemn treaties; nor did they take possession on
any such assumption of right; on the contrary, it was done under
84. Id. at 745-46.
85. Id. at 746, 748, 749, 750, 758.
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the guaranty of Congress to the inhabitants, without distinction,
of their rights of property, and with the continued assurance of
protection.'
On the international standing of Indian tribes and their legal contracts with
European sovereigns, Baldwin stated:
[I]t was [the King of Spain's] orders to his officers to continue
and confirm those relations which had previously existed, to
consider, treat and protect the Indians as his subjects, and to
give them new and most solemn pledges of his protection in all
their rights, as individuals; and as nations or tribes, competent
parties to treaties of mutual guaranty, for his, as well as their
protection ....
This was not done for slight reasons.., both king and Indians
[were bound] as contracting parties, in this respect as nations on
a footing of equality of right and power. The consequence was
that when once received into his protection as individuals, they
became entitled by the law of nations and of the provinces, on the
same footing as the other inhabitants thereof, to the benefits of the
law and government. . ..
On U.S. legal obligations in succeeding Spain, Baldwin stated:
When [the U.S.] acquired these provinces by the treaty of cession,
it was not stipulated that any treaty with the Indians should be
annulled, or its obligation be.held less sacred than it was under
Spain; nor is there the least reference to any intended change in
the relations of the Indians towards the United States. They came
in the place of the former sovereign by compact, on stipulated
terms, which bound them to respect all the existing rights of the
inhabitants, of whatever description, whom the king had
recognized as being under his protection. ...
When [the U.S.] acquired and took possession of the Floridas,
these treaties remained in force over all the ceded territory by the
orders of the king.. . and were binding on the United States, by
the obligation they had assumed by the Louisiana [Purchase], as
a supreme law of the land which was inviolable by the power of
Congress. They were also binding on the fundamental law of
Indian rights . . . . It would be an unwarranted construction of
these treaties, laws, ordinances and municipal regulations, were
we to decide that the Indians were not to be maintained in the
86. Id. at 749, 754.
87. Id. at 753-54.
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enjoyment of all the rights which they could have enjoyed under
either . . ..
Mitchel, as evidenced from these quotes, is vastly different from M'Intosh.
Whereas M'Intosh stressed the discovery principle as the prime diminishing
element to tribal political and property rights, Mitchel never even broached the
doctrine. Whereas M'Intosh held that tribes could not convey their impaired
right of occupancy to whomever they wanted, Mitchel held that the tribes'
right of occupancy was not handicapped, was as sacred as the fee simple of
whites, and could indeed be conveyed. Whereas M'!ntosh relied on
ethnocentric arguments of alleged tribal cultural inferiority as a significant
factor that reduced Indian rights, Mitchel stated that even the hunting territory
of tribes was entitled to protection and was equally as valid as the "improved"
farm fields of Anglo farmers.
One explanation for the discrepancy in Baldwin and the Court's views
hinges on the fact that in Mitchel the character of another sovereign, Spain,
and by extension, that of the United States, was directly involved. The
Spanish king, via his North American governors, had given his explicit
sanction to the Indian deeds. As Baldwin stated:
They [the deeds] are drawn up in great form; contain a perfect
recognition of the Indian grants, and give to them all the validity
which he [Spanish governor] could impart to them. They are
made in the name of the king, executed and attested in all due
formality, and their authenticity proved as public documents, and
by the testimony of witnesses to the official documents."
In M'Intosh the British monarchy was less explicitly involved, though there
was some implicit involvement, a fact Cohen seems unaware of. In fact, the
original land transactions of 1773 and 1775 involving the Illinois and
Piankeshaw tribes and the Illinois and Wabash land company's representatives
had been made with a certain amount of official sanction. As the land
company asserted in a memorial to the House of Representatives in December
1810, their land transactions with the tribes, while lacking in public authority,
were not made
without any public treaty, or other act of notoriety. On the
contrary, no conferences with Indians were ever more public or
more notorious. The conferences were held at British military
posts, in the view and presence of the British military and civil
officers. They lasted a month each time .... And finally, the
treaties, after having been interpreted to the Indians by the sworn
88. Id. at 754-55.
89. Id. at 728.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1994
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
interpreters of the British Government, were attested by its civil
and military officers.'
Furthermore, the original petitioners, William Murray et al. (the Illinois
Company) and Lord Dunsmore et al. (the Wabash Company), who, as
mentioned earlier, had first petitioned the Congress under the confederation
in 1781, actually received a favorable report from a House Committee in 1792
supporting their petition. As committee member Rep. Samuel Livermore
(Fed.-N.H.) stated:
In the opinion of the committee, the said deeds, being given by
the Indians, proprietors of the soil, before the declaration of the
Independence of the United States, for a valuable consideration,
bona fide paid, are sufficient to extinguish the Indian title to the
lands therein described: and, therefore, that, on the principles of
justice and equity, the United States should agree to the proposal
aforesaid made by the petitioners."'
This report, however, was accompanied by an adverse report and the land
company's efforts were stonewalled yet again. The land company continued
to petition the Congress periodically (from 1781 to 1816) for settlement of
their claims, but with no success. In 1818 the United States ceded the same
acreage to M'Intosh, thus leading to the M'Intosh decision.
A second possible explanation for the disparity in opinions involves the
fact that Mitchel et al., in contrast to the plaintiffs in M'Intosh, had the benefit
of several congressional laws which required the federal government to
execute the provisions of the Spanish-American treaty, one of which involved
protection of the property rights of Florida inhabitants. Later laws allowed
individuals to institute claims against the United States for losses they may
have sustained.0 The Supreme Court, as a coordinate branch of the federal
government, was deferring to the will of the legislature which had enacted
laws to protect individual property rights.
Finally, Baldwin stressed that the Supreme Court was acting as a "court of
equity" under the congressional laws which allowed private claims to be
brought before the Court. As a court of equity, Baldwin noted that the court
90. Memorial No. 177 to the House of Representatives, I lth Cong., 3d Sess., Concerning
the Illinois and Wabash Land Companies (Dec. 21, 1810), in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra
note 11, at I 1!-12.
91. Report No. 12 to the House of Representatives, 2d Cong., 1st Sess., Concerning the
Illinois and Wabash Land Companies (Apr. 3, 1792), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note
11, at 22 (Walter Lowrie ed., Duff Green 1834). The proposal referred to by Livermore was one
in which Murray and Dunsmore were willing to consider a surrender of all the lands they had
seczred in both deeds on the condition that "the United States reconvey to the company one-
fourth part of the said lands." Id.
92. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 716 (1835).
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was compelled to give the same attention to "imperfect, inchoate, and
inceptive titles as legal and perfect ones" and that the Court was required to
"decide by the same rules on all claims submitted to us, whether legal or
equitable."'93
Regardless of how we perceive the question of private-vs.-public purchases
of Indian lands, the involvement of legislative authority, or the judiciary's
actions as a court of equity, these matters do not minimize or detract from the
more profound issues we have addressed in examining both M'Intosh and
Mitchel: tribal political status, whether equal to European States and the
federal government (Mitchel) or "diminished and impaired" entities (M'Intosh);
aboriginal title to land and the aborigines' right to dispose of the same to
whomever they chose, a right recognized in Mitchel but denied in M'Intosh);
and the internationally established legal obligations of the United States to
enforce and protect tribal rights previously acknowledged by another foreign
power, obligations which were affirmed in Mitchel but negated in M'Intosh.
Based on the historical, political, and legal record examined, it is clear that
the Mitchel decision is a far more accurate inquiry into the recognized rights
of tribes to both property and sovereignty; rights unaffected by either the
doctrine of discovery or the doctrine of conquest. In M'Intosh, history was
"discarded" and Marshall meticulously established the legal fiction of
discovery and conquest to rationalize the diminution of tribal sovereignty and
tribal property rights. But in Mitchel, Baldwin drew from and relied upon the
historical record and the fact of tribal independence.' The fact that the
decision was unanimous, that it was written by Henry Baldwin, and that it
was rendered a dozen years after M'Intosh should give legal, historical, and
political scholars pause to reconsider this powerful case and to question its
relative obscurity over the last century-and-a-half. A synthesis of Mitchel
principles with the Worcester doctrines can effectively thwart the M'Intosh
ruling, which is historically and legally unsound.
93. Id. at 733.
94. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the
Content and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIM. L. REv. 203 (1989). Deloria points out
that the "mythical, doctrinally determined history [typified in the M'Intosh decision] ... will be
replaced with a more accurate history [typified in the Mitchel case] only with exceptional
difficulty and hardship." Id. at 223. Deloria notes that the "raw data of federal Indian law" is the
gross accumulation of all the relevant historical documents and policies produced by the events
derived from the interactions of hundreds of tribes with non-Indian settlers and their elected
officials. Id. at 204. But, although this data is primarily political and historical in nature it has
been "clothed in a legal/political vocabulary" to give the appearance that the federal government
consistently followed the Rule of Law. It is, therefore, imperative that solid historical analysis
should be the basis of court decisions and research by scholars. Id.
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